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DESIGN REVOLUTIONS	
Why designing may help treat psychosis  
Renedo Illarregi, Erikaa; Alexiou, Katerina a; Zamenopoulos, Theodore a  
a The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK. 
The paper presents some initial theoretical insights on why designing may help people with 
experience of psychosis. The paper reviews how psychosis has been discussed in the 
literature from a phenomenological point of view, and how it links to designing by looking at 
the themes of agency and embodiment. These insights are then used to formulate the 
hypothesis that the experience of designing, and design iteration, may pose a continuous 
force (and have an indirect effect) towards the coupling, or pulling together, of dimensions of 
experience such as perception, cognition and action which in psychosis are sometimes 
experienced as particularly fragmented. The paper contributes to our understanding of design 
and introduces the idea of design as treatment for the development of design projects to 
support mental health. 
Keywords: psychosis; co-design; schizophrenia: mental health; self; agency; 
embodiment; phenomenology; experience  
1 Introduction  
This paper is concerned with making connections between the experience of psychosis and 
the design process to explore whether designing can contribute to the treatment of 
psychosis. 
Mental health problems represent the largest cause of disability in the UK, and there is a 
requirement of participatory research and development of new ways to improve the services’ 
productivity (Mental Health Taskforce, 2017). The recovery movement, which broadly 
focuses on restoring functioning above and beyond symptom reduction and recognizes the 
ability of people with mental health problems to participate in society (Davidson, 2016),  and 
the patient-oriented treatment plans that acknowledge experiential knowledge have opened 
up doors to imagine what could constitute treatment, and the exploration for new ways in 
which recovery is supported more generally.  
 
While some studies exist that use design in mental health contexts, there is no research 
which explicitly looks at the effects of design thinking in mental health. There is no previous 
evidence to proof the benefits of designing for mental health problems, although authors 
experiences through professional practice seem to suggest positive changes. The paper 
focuses on describing a theoretical framework developed through the preparation of a co-
design project with participants with psychosis at a mental health charity. The aim of the 
theory is to inform the set up of co-design projects and guide data collection, but it is 
expected that empirical evidence will in turn help re-evaluate and re-formulate the theory, 
and develop alternative perspectives.    
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A variety of arguments can be drafted to support the idea that co-design may be reimagined 
as a treatment, which does not necessarily focus just on the individual. One such argument 
is that as powerlessness, loss of credibility and identity, isolation and hopelessness create 
most suffering to service users (Kaite, Karanikola, Merkouris, & Papathanassoglou, 2015), 
co-design provides an empowering platform. By respecting participants as experts in their 
experience and key actors due to their contributions (Sanders, 2000), co-design may be 
reimagined as a treatment that transcends the individual and focuses on the wider 
community or context where psychiatric and psychological distress is happening.  
Conceptualizing co-design itself as a kind of treatment is a radically different approach to the 
way co-design and co-creation have been approached and used within health services. 
Projects tend to focus on using co-design to inform the improvement of services or increase 
efficiency for instance, rather than using it as a treatment in itself. Some findings from a UK 
healthcare participatory project suggest participants did not think to be ‘doing’ the designing, 
and had doubts about the effectiveness of the intervention (Bowen et al., 2013). 
Among the projects led by designers specifically within the mental health context, the focus 
has been on developing appropriate design methods or innovative processes, and 
describing the design outcomes (Glazzard et al., 2015; Kaasgaard & Lauritsen, 1997; Kettley, 
Sadkowska, & Lucas, 2016; Nakarada-Kordic, Hayes, Reay, Corbet, & Chan, 2017), leaving 
the effects of participation on mental health users -aside as general feedback- yet to be 
explored. Even looking at the wider area of design for health, studies focusing on the effects 
of co-design on participants themselves appear rare, with the exception of a couple of 
studies looking at the potential of design thinking to help those affected by long-term 
physical conditions such as spinal cord injury (Macdonald 2013; Langley et al. ,2013).  
Nevertheless, the idea that participating in co-designing may have an impact in some way or 
another informed some studies which speculated why these changes could occur. With 
participants from the general population, Corcoran, Marshall, and Walsh (2017) suggest that 
cooperative place-making workshops supported changes to psychological and community 
wellbeing by enhancing both a sense of personal growth and a collective sense of place-
related optimism. Hendriks, Dreessen, and Schoffelen (2016) describe how participatory 
design could ‘enable’ increase in perceived quality of life and secondary gains which (as 
(Albrecht & Devlieger, 1999) describe) occur when a person with a disability (in their case 
diabetes) finds an enriched meaning secondary to the condition brought on by the disability. 
Renedo-Illarregi (2018) conceptualizes uncertainty as a potential explanation for changes 
that could be expected in people with mental health problems who partake in design. 
This paper focuses in the experience of psychosis in particular, and how the experience of 
designing may relate to it, building a hypothesis of why these may impact one another.  
1.1 Why focus on experience 
The lived experience of designing has been paramount in the study of design. According to 
Frauenberger, Good, & Keay-Bright (2010) the philosophical discipline of phenomenology 
provides the designer with a framework for studying user experience by affording an 
intrinsically contextual view of the way we interact with things around us. They argue that it 
also plays a critical role in participatory design when it is undertaken as an interpretive and 
generative process, mindful of end user experience rather than directed toward the 
specification of outcomes.  
3 
	
On the other hand, psychiatric research and treatment initiatives are moving away from 
traditional diagnostic categories and focus on transdiagnostic phenomena (Pienkos et al., 
2019). Many psychotherapeutic or recovery-focused initiatives within mental health charities 
are now organized around phenomena and according to experience, and charities rarely use 
diagnosis in the way they design, organize and provide their services. This is reflected in 
initiatives such as the service offered by the mental health charity who are collaborating in 
this study, which provides psychotherapy for people who have experience of psychosis, 
regardless of the reasons for such experiences. 
Increased awareness of the limitations of reductionist approaches that mostly rely on 
biologically oriented models, has led to alternative conceptualizations more interested in 
lived experience of psychosis (Hamm, Leonhardt, Ridenour, Lysaker, & Lysaker, 2018b). 
Indeed, as  reviewed by Hamm et al (2018a), both the philosophical phenomenological 
model of psychosis and the recovery model, focus on the first-hand experience of psychosis, 
and although they differ on methodology and epistemology, they are both interested in the 
alterations of subjectivity that occur in psychosis, and both contribute to interventions that 
are responsive to these alterations. 
Most recently, changes that relate to cognition, perception, selfhood and reality, temporality, 
interpersonal experience, and embodiment were reviewed across the psychiatry literature 
from a phenomenological point of view  (Pienkos et al., 2019) providing a great opportunity 
to build a shared, interdisciplinary framework to understand the experience of designing 
alongside the experience of these changes occurring in psychosis.  
With a primary interest on lived experience, in this paper we theorize changes that could 
occur (theoretically) when the experiences of designing and the experiences of psychosis 
interact. 
1.2 The structure of the paper 
The first part of the paper, centres around the question of how design may impact psychosis 
by discussing two main themes, agency and embodiment, which are of great relevance to 
psychiatry and design. The intention is not to provide an extensive literature review, but to 
provide an overall thematic analysis in order to illustrate insights that informed this project 
and the theoretical contribution which is presented at the end. The concluding section, 
presents a hypothesis of how designing could help treating psychosis by conceptually 
intertwining the themes discussed. 
It is important to clarify, nevertheless, that the data collection for this project has just 
commenced, and this theoretical argument is one of few which may emerge once more data 
is collected. Following an abductive approach, the aim is to generate a variety of 
explanations that could account while we are collecting data, continuously checking for 
alternative theorizations.  
2 Could designing treat psychosis?  
In order to review the potential of designing to help with the limiting and debilitating aspects 
of psychosis, we first look at two common themes across the phenomenology of psychosis 
and design literatures, and organize brief summaries around two main themes, agency and 
embodiment, which are, paramount to both research agendas.  
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Arguably, the themes of agency and embodiment are also relevant to the subjective 
experiences of designing and psychosis.  
In the literature in psychosis, we see these themes reflected upon from the point of view of 
what seems disrupted on the experience (diminished agency, disembodied self, 
disconnection with the world and others) but they are also seen as relevant for the proposed 
treatments or interventions to respond to the struggles often associated to psychosis.  
2.1 Agency  
A diminished sense of agency is a recurrent and common theme in research which deals 
with understanding the experience of psychosis. It appears central to studies that differ wildly 
both in epistemology and methodology. For instance Hamm et al (2018b) review the 
commonalities and differences across two research agendas, that is the phenomenology of 
psychosis and the recovery models.  By philosophical phenomenology they refer to research 
concerned with structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of 
view such as perceptual and cognitive aspects of how persons experience the self and its 
relation to the world around them (e.g. Parnas 2011). Recovery-oriented approaches on the 
other hand are those which focus on individual definitions of wellness and the processes 
which promote those (Leonhardt et al., 2017). They specifically focus on the ipseity 
disturbance conceptual model of schizophrenia, which is well known in phenomenological 
writings, and recovery writings that generalize from common and diverse experiences of 
movements towards well-being. Hamm et al (2018b) conclude that treatments following 
these paradigms need to address experiences of diminished agency and confused or fraught 
self-experience, primary focusing on helping patients to name, reflect upon, and respond to 
their experience, as a basis for action – a very familiar process to designers.   
On one hand, a diminished sense of agency may refer to the lesser ability to have an impact 
on the world around oneself. This feeling of disempowerment is something that most people 
can relate to and may experience at different points in their life. In many cases of psychosis, 
this particular sensation may indeed reflect the real situation quite accurately, as the power 
over the environment, others and even oneself can be extremely compromised by some 
events following breakdown such as being sectioned or treated compulsorily.  
However, from the lived experience of the psychotic, a diminished sense of agency may not 
only refer to a lesser ability to impact on the environment or what is being done to them; in 
some cases, the lack of a sense of agency may extend to one’s own inner world (e.g. 
thoughts, feelings, sense of will).  
A diminished sense of agency thus extents to the sphere of one’s inner world and 
experience. In these kinds of situations, the person is not only unable to act upon things and 
events ‘out there’, but he or she also experiences his or her inner existence as driven by 
foreign agency or subject to the agency of others. 
These various cognitive phenomena have been framed as alterations of thought-agency and 
ownership (Humpston & Broome, 2015). Examples portrayed in (Pienkos et al., 2019) 
include ‘thought insertion’, which is the inward projection of “other” thoughts into one’s 
mental space, and ‘audible thoughts’ referring to the vocalization of one’s own thoughts into 
an external space. Furthermore, Mayer-Gross (as cited in Sterzer et al. 2016) proposed that 
thought insertion involves those thoughts to ‘become sensory’, no longer being experienced 
as thought but as objects inserted by foreign agency.  
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One of the most characteristic experiences of psychosis, hallucinations, are considered as 
self-disturbances to the extent they are perceived as occurring independently from self, and 
this separation between self and its automatic processing is also often experienced as due 
to foreign agency. (Pienkos et al., 2019)   
Fuchs (2007) suggests that the inhibition of unintended thoughts or actions fails when the 
essential syntheses that relieve us of the task of actively connecting and building up the 
perceived objects, situations and habitual patterns of our life are disturbed. Associations or 
even bodily movements appear ‘out of the blue’ and instead of serving as a medium for the 
patient’s intentional relation to the world, their thoughts, perceptions or movements may 
occur as single erratic blocks that stand in the way of their intentional effort. (Fuchs, 2007) 
Agency is a fundamental pillar for the activity of designing. In design, the choice for action, is 
influenced by the perception of the consequences of the action. It is also been 
conceptualized as emergent from the interaction with design materials, see for instance 
(Tholander, Normark, & Rossitto, 2012), who describe this process in the context of 
intensive short-time prototyping.  
Let us imagine and speculate what happens when a person with experiences of psychosis is 
presented with a design brief. The person is confronted paradoxically with 1) having to pay 
attention to the constraints of what is ‘out there’ therefore becoming aware that their actions 
will have a potential impact in the external world and 2) the multiplicity of responses that the 
brief entails, basically by endless choices. The person may make any decision but must also 
take into account the effects of the decisions and act accordingly. Being confronted with this 
situation, the psychotic needs to act upon external perception (e.g. brief) as well as personal 
narratives (e.g. there is many ways to respond appropriately to the same brief). Through this 
process, dimensions of experience such as perceptions, thoughts, feelings need to 
somehow coordinate. 
2.2 Embodiment 
As Hamm et al (2018b) summarize, if attending to subjective experience is addressed 
principally by promoting agency, treatment should attend to mental phenomena in the 
context of embodied experience. 
The subject of embodiment is also one of the themes Pienkos et al (2019) use to organize 
their extensive review of  the literature on hallucinations, suggesting it is central to the 
phenomenological study of psychosis. 
A review of implications and applications of the subject of embodiment in schizophrenia is 
discussed in Tschacher et al (2017). They remark how embodiment has become an 
influential concept in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, and that the embodiment of 
the mind constitutes the basis of social interaction and communication. Sensorimotor 
dysfunctions are closely associated with affective and psychotic psychopathology, leading to 
altered timing in the processing of stimuli and to disordered appraisals of the environment.  
Alterations of bodily self-representations have also been suggested to be a core component 
of schizophrenia, for example changes in size and shape, alterations in body ownership or 
out of body experiences. (Pienkos et al., 2019).  
The idea of disembodied self is central to the existential interpretation of psychosis 
presented in The divided self (Laing, 1960). In Laing’s thesis, the schizoid person, who may 
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or not develop psychosis, consists on an unembodied self, and a false self-system who 
deals with others and the world. He stresses that although most people regard the embodied 
position as healthy and the unembodied pathological, sometimes an individual should try to 
disentangle himself from his body, for instance to achieve discarnate spirituality.  
On the other hand, the concept of embodiment also takes a central role in design research, 
often implicitly. As Peter et al (2013) describe, there is a strong view in the literature that any 
practical activity, and perhaps especially designing, embodies different types of thinking and 
that these types of thinking can interact with one another in achieving a particular goal. As 
(Loke & Robertson, 2011) summarize, the thinking is not in words or propositions, but in 
visual, tactile and somato-sensory forms. 
Schön’s work on reflection-in-action (e.g. Schön 1983), which guided an extensive research 
agenda referred to as the reflective paradigm or design as exploration (see Hay et al. 2017 
for an extensive review), is highly related to the idea of embodiment, where thinking and 
doing are experienced as an integrated whole.   
From a phenomenological perspective, Poulsen and Thøgersen (2011) argue that embodied 
engagement of the designers plays a fundamental role both in understanding the problem at 
hand and in opening up new ideas leading to a new design solution. According to their study, 
the verbal interaction constantly finds its meaning in reference to a tacit level of embodiment, 
which remains unspoken. The verbal interaction is also integrated into the designer's tacit 
use of items in the surroundings and design thinking relies on a more complex and 
multidimensional interaction, which is based on the pre-linguistic engaged perspective of the 
lived body.  
Now let us again imagine a person with psychosis is presented with a design brief, and/or 
some tools to design, for instance paper prototyping. Suppose the person experiences the 
body as separated from self or alien, or even perceives his/her weight in an unusual manner. 
In responding to the brief, the psychotic is forced to use the body to react to the object of 
design through feedback (perception) and action. By following the design process, a 
psychotic person may iteratively reconnect to their self (mind and body) even if only in the 
specific context of responding to a brief.  
3 Summary and discussion 
Summarizing, we have described how a sense of agency and embodiment are critical 
dimensions both in the experience of psychosis and designing.  
Our concluding thesis is that the activity of designing and design iteration may act upon this 
experiential landscape as a continuous force towards the gradual integration of the 
fragmented dimensions of experience found in psychosis.  
This theoretical concept has been developed by immersing in literature in an attempt to 
empathize with the experience of psychosis and understand the profound ontological 
differences implied, whilst reflecting on first hand experiences of designing and visualizing 
how these positions may interact. The theory here described was first articulated in a visual, 
dynamic form, when trying to understand the experience of psychosis alongside that of 
designing, and explore the meanings portrayed by authors who looked at the lived 
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experience of psychosis and even described it in visual forms. The process involved the 
hacking of existing conceptual diagrams and the development of a new one, which is 
adopted here to assist in maintaining a conceptual thread and communicate the theory 
visually.  Put it another way, the theory was ‘prototyped’ as in physical form.   
The design object, or focus of attention, supposes a continuous demand on both perception 
and action and the body. For the design concept to move and iterate forward, and the 
designer to be able to make design decisions (which transcend personal preference and are 
embedded in the world) all these elements (agency, perception, action, body, object) need to 
coordinate with one another. As (Tholander et al., 2012) describe, neither technology nor 
people are the sole performing agents that drive activity forward – but rather the two in 
interplay.  
The psychotic person may begin the task by compensating for this lack of integrated 
experience and agency with rational thinking (e.g. make conscious connections among 
things commonly experienced as integrated). But the designing continues and the object 
moves forward, demanding some coherence in the perceptions and actions that are most 
relevant to the present situation. Design activity may even encourage redirecting thoughts 
that are intrusive or dreamy back into the design focus by indirectly informing creative shifts 
or innovative ideas. By following the design process a psychotic person may slowly begin to 
pull these fragments of their experience together, which then provide the basis for the 
gradual emergence and realisation of agency.  
In order to visually illustrate this theory and integrate it with earlier summaries, we look first 
how these fragmented dimensions of experience have been visualized in psychosis literature 
through two very different examples. Although referring to highly complex phenomena in 
reality, these diagrams are relatively simple ways to facilitate the comprehension of how 
radically different the world and oneself is experienced when dealing with psychosis. From 
the understanding of those diagrams, we build a final diagram which portrays our theory.  
This first diagram (Figure 1) is found within the work RD Laing The Divided self (Laing, 1960). 
In this diagram, we understand how having a divided self may result in perception becoming 
unreal, and action futile, rather than meaningful. Simply put, when the self is embodied, 
action and perception are connected in a healthy cycle and the self has direct access to the 
other, which could be a thing, other people or the world for instance. When the self retracts 
to some inner dimension and a false self operates within the world, perception is no longer 
experienced directly, and action is no longer associated with one’s own will. In this diagram, 
the disconnection or uncoupled action and perception results from a self being displaced. 
Experience is no longer integrated and embodied.  
The main way to normalize this kind of situation according this diagram would be to try to 
help the inner self gravitate towards the centre to align again within the circle. If we try to 
visualize the act of designing within this conceptual diagram, we could imagine it as a 
rotating axis that crosses the centre of the cycle of perception and action represented 
(Figure 2). 
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Figure 1. Pag 81 in (Laing, 1960) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. designing in relation to Laing's theory, (1960)  
 
 
The next diagrams below, by Fuchs (2007), refer to a different phenomenon described 
earlier in this paper, that of intentionality, which is often disordered in Schizophrenic people 
who deal with psychosis. According to Fuchs (2007)  the basic temporal structure of mental 
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life as an integration of past, present and future could be paralleled, phenomenologically, 
to Husserl’s analysis of the structure of internal time consciousness, consisting of a 
retentional, presentational and protentional function. These functions operate in the most 
basic levels of consciousness and are capable of integrating the sequence of single 
moments into an ‘intentional arc’, enabling  us to direct ourselves towards objects and goals 
in a meaningful way (Figure 3, (Fuchs, 2007)  
 
Figure 3. Structure of internal time consciousness, adapted by (Fuchs, 2007) from (Husserl, 1966) 
The fragmentation of the intentional arc, leaves single elements of perception, action and 
thought processes unconnected, and they come to explicit awareness as alienated or 
opaque phenomena. As Fuchs (2007) describes, as a consequence the automatic 
constitution of reality is dismantled and has to be replaced by active or rational 
reconstruction, which overburdens the patient’s adaptive intentional capacity. 
In psychosis, a failure of the continuous intertwining of succeeding moments, and especially 
of the protentional function (represented in figure 4), leads to a loss of the tacit or operative 
intentionality that carries the acts of perceiving, thinking and acting. 
 
Figure 4. Protentional function (Fuchs, 2007) 
 
In the following diagrams, the protentional function is represented in the cases of focused 
activity, alongside dilated and retracted protention which happens in creativity and dreaming 
or drug induced states for instance (Figure 5) 
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Figure 5. From left to right, focussed protention (e.g. in concentrated thinking or speaking), dilated protention (e.g 
day-dreaming, free association and creativity) and retracted protention (e.g. in dreaming and drugged states). 
(Fuchs, 2007) 
 
According to Fuchs, the schizophrenic patient still tries to think actively. Unlike the dreamer, 
he is not just the passive spectator of his mental experiences. His intentional activity starts, 
but then it is suddenly thwarted by intruding splinters of thoughts that appear ‘out of the blue’. 
Thus we may say that his protentionality is not only weakened and retracted, but fragmented 
(Figure 6).(Fuchs, 2007) 
 
 
Figure 6. Fragmented protention in schizophrenia. (Fuchs, 2007)  
 
Leading to our final contribution, we create a diagram that aims to integrate, 
phenomenologically, the two contributions of Laing and Fuchs. In this diagram, agency and 
intention emerge from this iterative cycle or perceiving, thinking and acting, as if by inertia 
forward in time, which is why it is represented in a vertical axis (Figure 7). When psychosis 
happens, however, fragments of perception, action and thought appear to awareness as 
alien, and thus a sense of agency and intentionality is unlikely to emerge and be sustained.  
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Figure 7. A diagram bringing together Fuchs and Laing’s theoretical insights  
 
In the final diagram which illustrates the proposed theory (Figure 8), we have represented 
the experiences of both the divided self and the unconnected elements of perceptions, 
thoughts and actions as lines and shapes within the lower layer. These lines and shapes 
represent dimensions of experiences of psychosis which have been discussed throughout 
the paper. Actions, thoughts and perceptions, may not be experienced as integrated, and 
there may be a diminished or lacking sense of self which is embodied and holds the 
experiences around some more or less stable citadel. There is a lack of sense of agency 
and intention which could be thought as emerging from, or necessary for, the continuous, 
coherent process of perceiving, thinking and acting upon the world. 
We next invite the psychotic -who is often struggling with these experiences- to engage with 
designing. The design object, or focus of attention (Figure 8), represents the centre of our 
design efforts. It can be argued that the design focus of attention in itself holds within it some 
form of retention (where it came from or what informed it) and protention (what it will be for). 
Unlike art work, the design object moves forward by constantly pulling actions, thoughts and 
perceptions into some coherent frameworks which should be embedded in the context of 
use. Artistic exploration has a very different set of demands and in psychiatry has often had 
the function of helping express these fragmented and unusual aspects of experience. It is 
perhaps a brilliant medium to express the often-bizarre nature of one’s experience, with 
tremendous therapeutic value. However, in contrast to design, artistic exploration does not 
always demand changing aspects of experience. 
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Figure 8. Diagram showing how designing may help treat psychosis by connecting fragmented aspects of 
experience. 
 
Most actions performed in designing, and the decision making associated with it, demand 
the integration of perception and action quasi simultaneously. For instance, seeking 
feedback, testing out prototypes, sketching, making calculations, evaluating shapes or forms, 
all pull dimensions of experience such as acting and perceiving together. Within a design 
process, the next action (e.g. sketch) is determined by the previous perception (e.g. scale 
doesn’t work for the user), via the body (e.g. using the body literally to sketch and even 
imagining our body interacting with the object to make a judgement of the scale). 
The diagram shows the fragmented elements of experience, summarizing from earlier 
descriptions of how it is like to be psychotic, in the lower layer. The central axis, rotates 
through design iteration, and the object of design, functions as a force or focus of design 
attention, which continuously demands perception, action and thoughts to be put in relation 
to one another.   
The repetitive, continuous activity of designing which moves forward through iteration, 
pushes the single elements that are experienced as alienated or fragmented to gravitate 
towards one another. A design focus may help the psychotic to couple and connect 
elements of action, perception and thought together in a meaningful way.  
Designing and design iteration, may pose some revolving force towards the reintegration of 
the dimensions of experience, through which agency may, with time, remerge. 
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3.1 Next steps 
 
The above theory was motivated by a co-design project which is currently taking place with 
patients attending a Psychosis service in a mental health charity. The aim of the project is to 
experiment with the use of design as a way to help with psychosis. Through this 
collaboration, participants are being encouraged to engage with and reflect upon designing, 
and the author is encouraged to reflect upon the experience of psychosis in relation.  
In contrast with earlier work reviewed above, the lived experience of participants who go 
through the design process and the forming of this process from their point of view, is the 
main focus of this project.  
In brief summary, the project recruited participants from an ongoing therapeutic service for 
people with psychosis, with the support of staff. It consists in one design facilitator, the 
author, attending the service space every week. The researcher facilitated a semi structured 
process, which was presented to participants to have three main stages: understanding 
design, finding and mapping situations and creating design(s). The challenge consisted in 
providing a space that would accommodate different ways to participate and acknowledge 
everyone’s contribution as unique and valuable.  
The theory presented here is based upon phenomenological descriptions of psychosis in 
relation to design and has been influenced only by the very first interactions with the 
participants that were recruited.  As this project is still ongoing, it is too early to report any 
project results and mental health changes. The ongoing analysis of data may provide us 
more concrete evidence on the actual impact on people’s lives, and may lead to different 
insights about the nature of designing and mental health problems.  
The wider research agenda includes generating alternative explanations alongside further 
data collection and analysis. Following an abductive approach, the intention is to generate 
plausible explanations by constructing and testing different scenarios in practice 
(Zamenopoulos & Alexiou, 2018) 
The research is expected to contribute to our understanding of design and how co-design 
projects within mental health, can motivate and influence the development of new treatments. 
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